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Who, Why and How : 
Assessing the Legitimacy of Secession 
Josette BAER 
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the breakdown of bipolarity, the international community had to 
cope with independence movements spreading in Eastern, Central and 
Southeastern Europe. Given the peculiar coercive character of the So-
viet and Yugoslav Federations and the Soviet Union’s hegemonial rule 
in Central Europe, the wish for independent statehood can be under-
stood as a sum of single secessionist movements. This article investi-
gates secession as a moral problem of public international law; it also 
attempts to define normative criteria for the assessment of secessionist 
legitimacy. What conditions are required for a legitimate secession? On 
what political, social or historical characteristics should a legitimate 
secession be based in order to obtain international recognition? The 
analysis is carried out on three levels: legitimacy of the actors (Who), 
legitimacy of the secessionist argument (Why) and procedural legiti-
macy (How). The analysis is illustrated by three examples of recent se-
cessionist movements: Slovakia, FYR Macedonia and Chechnya. 
Introduction1 
What is secession? How is it conceived by public international law? How 
does it start and when is it accomplished? Does it mean "self-determination 
plus territorial sovereignty" in the sense of "exit and statehood"? Or should 
it be understood as "exit and integration" in the sense of a mere exchange of 
sovereign rule to which the entity in question wishes to submit itself? And, 
when dealing with the question, whether a distinct social entity has the right 
to "exit" or not, which are the principles applied by public international 
law? These are the issues I want to address. 
                                                 
1 This article represents a contribution to the ongoing SNSF research project 
"Normative principles in International Politics". The project is led by Prof. G. Kohler 
and PD U. Marti, Chair of Political Philosophy, University of Zurich. 
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Let me make some introductory remarks. According to the prevailing 
doctrine of international law, secession is defined as “the separation of part 
of the territory of a state which originally takes place in the absence of con-
sent of the previous sovereign” (emphasis added) (Haverland 1987: 384). 
Due to the lack of descriptive clarity, "secession" seems to be a term with 
negative connotations; the term evokes the picture of a social entity’s ille-
gitimate political separatism close to treachery. Also, it entails an illegal 
element since secession is connected with the breaking of contracts and 
commitments. History’s best-known example for a failed secession is the 
American Civil War, which was caused by the Southern states’ wish to 
withdraw from the Union. Based on the argument that slavery as a source of 
economic welfare was unjust and Southern self determination was enjoyed 
by the white community only, the Northern prevention of secession was le-
gitimate according to the moral criteria of equality of men fixed in the con-
stitution. Focussing on the changes of the European political landscape after 
1989, the break up of the Soviet Federation, her Central European hegem-
ony and the Yugoslav Federation have been described as a sum of single 
peripheral secessions (Buchanan 1991: 14-15). In contrast to the American 
secession, the "exit" claims of the various territorial and social entities, 
however, crucially differed. Based on the wish for self-determination, the 
underpinning argument read that the prevailing sovereignty lacked legiti-
macy. Legally fixed in the federative constitutions and the block treaties, the 
communist parties’ rule and sovereignty nevertheless had been achieved in 
an unjust way lacking the explicit, free and open consent of the ruled. Re-
gardless whether the leave of the Federation or the block alliance was con-
cerned, independent statehood was regarded as reward for unjust rule by the 
central and south Europeans. That was the reason why the entities wishing 
to exit preferred to use terms such as "national sovereignty" or "independent 
statehood". Given these two different cases of the concept "secession", I 
shall in the following show how secession is regarded by international law. 
Given the distinct fashion how international law deals with the principle 
of self-determination, "secession plus state-formation" represents a threat to 
the international stability since it is diametrically opposed to the principle of 
equal territorial sovereignty of the states. According to this "Janus-faced" 
nature of self-determination, international law has traditionally acknowl-
edged cases of secession by virtue of the evident presence of elements con-
stitutive for state sovereignty (Haverland 1987: 385): territory (Staatsge-
biet), nation (Staatsvolk) and governmental rule (Staatsgewalt) (Verdross, 
Simma 1984: 223ff.). A further peculiarity lies in the absence of a clear 
definition of the term "nation". Due to the historical development of 19th 
century nationalist movements, the claim for sovereignty was mostly based 
on the national argument. I will not attempt to discuss the term "nation" in 
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this paper. I conceive of the self-ascription of being a nation as the core 
element of an entity’s self-determination. Also, according to international 
law, the principle of self-determination excludes a priori the definition of 
"nation" as entity entitled to a state of its own. For the sake of conceptional 
clarity, I therefore prefer to keep to a neutral fashion speaking of an associa-
tion of citizens inhabiting a distinct territory and sharing the same political 
interests: change of citizenship and transfer of sovereignty. Thus, for the 
purpose of this paper, the term "polity" seems appropriate. 
A further topic relevant for secessionist legitimacy is not so much, 
whether the seceding polity is characterized by a noticeable homogeneity in 
culture, custom or language, but rather, how the new state will relate to the 
international community. As international law lacks the general right of se-
cession, "self-determination via statehood" depends virtually on the recogni-
tion of third states and the United Nations. However, this seems controver-
sial: while the adherents of the constitutive theories regard recognition as a 
constitutive element of statehood, the theorists of the declaratory principle 
conceive of recognition only as a declaratory act and statehood per se as 
self-sufficient (Haverland 1987: 388). I will not go in depth of this judicial 
discussion; from the above said it must be clear, that I conceive of interna-
tional recognition as crucial in this matter. Apart from the absence of a right 
of secession, what can secession entail? Let me in the following explain, 
what I mean by "secession" and what not. 
It has been stressed that secession should be analyzed separately from 
state-formation, since both movements represent distinct processes (Bu-
chanan 1991: 22). In reference to the above quote of international law, the 
goal of secession consists in the change of sovereignty. Therefore, I under-
stand "secession" as "secession plus consequence" since it is directed to-
ward the second step of establishing the new sovereign. There are further 
two types of "secession plus consequence": secession plus state-formation 
and secession plus integration. The latter represents the case in which entity 
A claims to withdraw from the originary state M in order to integrate to 
state B. The goal of this type of secession consists in the merger with an-
other state whose sovereignty is preferred. Since such a scenario is usually 
related to cultural and ethnic entities who wish to unite with the ‚mother 
nation‘, which is considered to be their ancestor, the pre-secession state is 
faced with a problem of irredenta. Irredentist secessionist movements are 
characterized by the active involvement of the "mother nation" on behalf of 
the co-nationals abroad. Therefore one could speak of a situation of com-
petitive sovereignty between two states. As "secession plus integration", or 
more precisely, the irredentist community’s secession and following union 
with the "mother state" immediately relates to the difficult definition of "na-
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tion" and "minority", I will not deal with this case here. Let me therefore 
precise, what I mean by "secession plus state-formation". 
First, "secession plus state-formation" is based on the polity’s claim for 
exerting sovereignty over the territory it inhabits, which due to whatever 
historic reasons had been denied in the past (for example Israel, Slovakia). 
The second case represents the claim for regaining formerly existent sover-
eignty once illegitimately abolished (for example, Lithuania, Estonia and 
Latvia). I shall deal with both of these cases in this investigation. 
For the sake of clearly limited terms, let me shortly explain, why I do not 
consider "secession" as appropriate a term when dealing with supranational 
political buildings like the European Union or the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. One could argue that the decision to leave such a structure 
represents indeed a secession since it zeals at the regaining of the amount of 
sovereignty once ceded by virtue of the membership treaties agreed upon. 
However, the crucial thing in this matter has to do with the nature of these 
structures and the amount of sovereignty: the amount of sovereignty ceded 
to a supranational building differs quantitatively from sovereignty estab-
lished by state-building. It also differs qualitatively, because the decision to 
enter the union has been met by sovereign states which expressed their con-
sent by committing themselves to agreements whose details and conditions 
they were able to negotiate. Also, the notion of citizenship is different; a 
state’s exit from EU is linked with the loss of distinct rights formerly granted 
by Union citizenship while state citizenship remains untouched. In contrast, 
the secessionist polity aims at the exchange of citizenship; the main goal of 
secession consists in the abolition of the former citizenship and the estab-
lishment of the preferred one. For the leave of a supranational building I 
therefore would suggest to speak of cancellation of membership rather than 
of secession. However, the inclusion of a right to leave the treaty, not a right 
to secession, can be favorable for the emergence of a political union; the 
granted possibility of legal withdrawal makes entry easier and backs up 
membership psychologically and politically (Buchanan 1991: 37). 
This study attempts at defining normative categories which can meet the 
requirements of the practice of international law exerted by existing interna-
tional legal institutions. It does not attempt to contribute to a theory which 
misses the crucial point that state existence first of all stands in need of be-
ing confirmed by the international community.2 Such an approach has since 
been lacking. Ideal-liberal theories dealing with the issue of ideal consent of 
the individual and the state, the state’s profoundly questioned legitimacy 
and teleological justifications of its sovereignty (Wellman 1995: 154f.) lack 
the crucial role the international community plays in secessions. Theories 
 
2 I wish to thank the anonymous referee for his helpful comments on this point. 
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based on the principle of "remedial right only" (Buchanan 1997: 61) favor-
ing the establishment of a limited right of secession as remedy for suffered 
injustice neglect the fact that secession can be claimed for as prevention. 
They also miss the peculiar status of self-determination in international law, 
and the practice which has to consider both international stability and self-
determination of single polities. 
Given the current practice of international law, the secessionist entity has 
to convince the international community not only of its own legitimacy, but 
also, that the sovereignty of the state from which it wishes to exit, lacks le-
gitimacy. International legal institutions thus are dealing with the problem 
of legitimacy of emerging states. Buchanan has pointed on the importance 
of improving the existing legal international institutions rather than develop-
ing ideal theories of secession (1997: 61). The example of FYR Macedonia, 
however, will show, that the approach to legitimize secession as ‚remedial 
right only‘ (Buchanan 1997: 60f.) does not represent a theory sufficient for 
the legitimacy of secessionist movements. I therefore attempt to show that 
criteria of legitimacy of "secession plus state-formation" movements have to 
meet distinct requirements in order to be recognized by the international 
community. What are these requirements based upon? 
Let me now present my definition of secession and, in the sequel, the 
three-folded model of secessionist legitimacy. 
I define "secession" for the purpose of this article as follows: by "seces-
sion as secession plus state-formation" I understand a separatist movement 
undertaken by a distinct polity led by the wish to withdraw the territory it 
inhabits from the originary state. The secessionist process has been success-
fully accomplished, when the polity’s sovereignty has been established in 
correspondence with the change of citizenship. Also, the new borders as 
well as the status of legal subjectivity of universal international law must be 
recognized by the members of the international community. 
According to the principle of state sovereignty constituted by the three 
elements of governmental rule, territory and nation, the legitimacy of "se-
cession plus state-formation" is immediately connected with these three 
elements: the legitimacy of Who, Why and How. With other words: Who 
represents the governmental rule of the polity, Why has sovereignty to 
change, and How, by which means, is the change of sovereignty under-
taken? Therefore, I shall investigate the legitimacy of secession in three 
steps structured accordingly in three sections: the first section deals with the 
legitimacy of Who, the actors in power, e.g. the political leaders initiating, 
promoting and/or negotiating secession. As the relation between actors and 
polity consists in a power relation, the model of "legitimate power" 
(Beetham 1991) shall be presented as prerequisite. In the second section I 
shall analyze the legitimacy of Why, the legitimacy of the secessionist claim. 
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This section concerns the fundamental justification(s), why the territory’s sov-
ereignty should change; basically, these justifications entail specific arguments 
of cultural preservation, self-defense, sovereignty as a moral reward, a 
remedium for discrimination and injustice suffered in the past. The legiti-
macy of How, the procedure undertaken by the actors in order to initiate and 
promote the political process toward sovereignty, will be object of the third 
and last section. The way how the claim is dealt with by the political repre-
sentatives of the polity is of crucial importance for the neighboring states 
and the international community, because the future state’s ability to main-
tain political and territorial stability is mirrored by the procedure chosen. 
I shall illustrate the model of secessionist legitimacy by three examples 
of secessionist processes in recent history: Slovakia as example of a suc-
cessful secession, FYR Macedonia as questioned secession and Chechnya 
representing a failed secessionist movement. Due to restraint of space I can-
not not give a detailed analysis of the developments of the countries chosen; 
details not being of immediate impact for the secessionist developments 
shall be neglected. I am aware of this reduction in historic precision; how-
ever, this is the prize paid for a more general and theory-oriented investiga-
tion whose aim is to contribute to the issue of secession by formulating 
normative criteria acceptable to the practice of international law. Due to the 
"legal vacuum" of the issue, e.g. the mentioned lack of clear definitions of 
"secession" and "nation" and the general lack of a right of secession, the 
assessment of secessionist legitimacy has to consist of normative and de-
scriptive elements. For the sake of theoretical principles capable of being 
applied to the topical political realities and the practice of international law, 
the analysis of empirical examples represents a crucial condition. Therefore, 
a ‚mixture‘ of normative and descriptive arguments is unavoidable.3 Before 
presenting the three-folded model of legitimacy, let me remind the reader of 
some commonplaces. 
Without any reluctance, the international community recognized Slova-
kia’s statehood, and with this, the Slovak secession. The dissolution of the 
Czechoslovak Federation was not hindered by the Czech Republic neither. 
The international recognition of FYR Macedonia’s sovereignty, declared in 
1991, was delayed due to Greece’s obstruction policy; eventually in 1993, 
UNO and EU recognized her independence. Greece did not question Mace-
donia‘s sovereignty, but protested vehemently against the name of the new 
state since she regarded the concept "Macedonia/Makedonija" as well as the 
flag symbol showing the 16-rayed "Sun of Vergina" as Greek national prop-
erty. Only with the increasing crisis in Kosovo and after mediation by Rich-
ard C. Holbrooke, the Greek-Macedonian compromise came into being in 
 
3 I thank the anonymous referee for drawing my attention on this crucial point. 
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1995; the two Greek blockades of the port of Thessaloniki back in 1992 and 
1994 had led to Macedonian trade losses amounting to more than $1.5 bil-
lion (Ramet 1995: 226). Finally, the Chechen attempt to secede represents 
the most problematic of the country studies: after Chechnya had declared 
independence in 1991, Russia sent troops in order to prevent the secession. 
The 21-month war was officially ended with the signing of the peace pact in 
May 1997. Since the election of Aslan Maskhadov as president in January 
1997, the secessionist movement has been carried on on political grounds; the 
discussion on the final Chechen exit from the Russian Federation, however, 
has been postponed for 5 years according to the agreement of August 1996 
(Goble 1997). At the time of writing, Russia has intervened in Chechnya again. 
Who – The Legitimacy of the Secessionist Actors 
The secessionist polity’s actors represent a crucial factor of secession. The 
group of representatives, the political elite, does not only initiate, promote 
and/or negotiate the secessionist process; it is responsible for the outcome. 
Since it exercises, generates and modifies power, its relationship with the 
ruled, is based on power. Referring to our type of "secession plus state-
formation", it is very likely that the actors in charge of the secessionist process 
will also play a decisive role in the building of the new state. The relation-
ship between the dominant and the subordinate thus demands some clarify-
ing thoughts. Questioning the legitimacy of the actors means to put into 
question primarily the legitimacy of power in general. What does legitimate 
power mean? Which conditions or features are required to describe a power 
system as legitimate, to determinate the actors as legitimate? Is legitimate 
power merely a matter of charismatic individuals, of distinct institutional 
prerequisites or a reference to historically grown traditions and customs? 
According to the Weberian notion of legitimacy as "belief in legitimacy", 
legitimacy seems to represent a static concept depending merely on the peo-
ple’s approval of a regime as legitimate by virtue of their beliefs. This 
would mean that the regime in power can be described as legitimate, if peo-
ple do believe in its legitimacy, e.g. in the legitimacy of rational-legal, tradi-
tional or charismatic rule. However, the relationship between "legitimacy" 
and people’s beliefs in legitimacy requires a theoretical clarification: a re-
gime in power is not legitimate, because people believe in its legitimacy, but 
because its rule can be expressed, justified in terms of their beliefs (Beetham 
1991: 11). When assessing the legitimacy of a power relation, the people’s be-
lief in the regime’s legitimacy constitute one factor, but more importantly: 
what makes people believe in the legitimacy of a regime, when do they stop 
believing, on which grounds do they judge a regime as being legitimate or 
illegitimate, when and by which actions does power turn from legitimate to 
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questioned to illegitimate power? Three factors render a regime legitimate: 
the legal validity, which underpins the acquisition and exercise of power, 
the importance of the rules according to current values and beliefs of the polity 
and the evidence of consent expressed by action (Beetham 1991: 12f.). 
The first and basic level of legitimacy is that of the conformity of rules: 
in order to describe a power relationship as legitimate, the acquisition and 
exercise of power has to correspond with the principles of law, the constitu-
tion. Rules do not necessarily have to form a legal codex, they may exist 
also in an unwritten form as a society’s informal conventions or customs. 
However, societies tend to formalize the rules of power in order to resolve 
and prevent disputes on power; the authority of the legal codes and the ap-
plication of the law are acknowledged as final, since due to their validity 
every individual of the society is subject to the legal system, the powerful as 
well as the subordinate. 
The existence of a legal system, however, is not sufficient a factor for the 
legitimacy of power, as the legal codes, the rules guiding the acquisition and 
exercise of power, require justification themselves. The second level of the 
legitimacy of a power relation thus consists in the extent to which the legal 
rules can be justified in terms of beliefs shared by both dominant and subor-
dinate (Beetham 1991: 17). Beliefs in a given society change, as the historic 
examples of women’s right to vote and the end of slavery have shown. The 
relationship between conventions or customs are fluently changing: customs 
can turn to legal codes and elder legal principles can disappear from the co-
dex due to the significant lack of actuality. The importance of beliefs, to 
which extent power, its acquisition and the rules of exercise are justified, 
lies in their function of serving as source of final authority, the common 
sense: to be justified in terms of the beliefs shared by the powerful and the 
subordinate, the rules must provide that those in power are capable of its 
exercise and that the power system expresses the general interest (Beetham 
1991: 17). The fact, that in most of the Eastern and Central European satel-
lite states the abolition of the section fixing the single rule of the Communist 
Party was the first demand on the dissidents’ agenda, demonstrates that the 
legal code lacked justification in terms of the citizens’ beliefs and values. 
Finally, the third level of legitimate power relates to the public: a power 
relationship can be said to be legitimate, if evidence of expressed and popu-
lar consent features the relation between subordinate, the power system and 
those in power. To make sure, that the citizens agree with the characteristic 
features of the power relation and the powerful in charge, the expression of 
consent requires explicit action such as swearing an oath, participating in an 
election, agreements or initiative rituals. The importance of publicly ex-
pressed consent consists in its contribution to legitimacy (Beetham 1991: 
18): the evidence of consent actively undertaken by the sum or single repre-
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sentatives of the citizens has a subjectively binding force, which represents 
a normative commitment. The publicly expressed acknowledgement obliges 
those taking part to follow the rules of loyalty by virtue of their own credi-
bility in front of the public. Regardless of the distinct individual motives, it 
is important that the consent is expressed publicly. The transparency or pub-
licity of the ritual, in Soviet terms once called Glasnost signifying every-
thing, what can and must be publicly spoken about, fulfills the need for con-
firmation of the powerful and the power system. I would interpret Gorba-
chev’s program of Glasnost as a test of legitimacy: a test to check public 
consent as well as the justifiability of the policy of Perestrojka (Transfor-
mation). The crucial question, however, was not so much, whether the sub-
ordinate would confirm the new policy, rather, whether the fundamental 
basis of Marxist-Leninist power, the Party’s rank and file, shared the beliefs 
of the Central Committee and Politburo. 
To conclude the theoretical prerequisites, the legitimacy of a power rela-
tion does not exist as an ideal 100% legitimacy of the political leadership, 
nor of the political system; in any given society, a critique of power and the 
power system exists. Also, as mentioned above, the validity of legal codes 
and rules is perpetually changing; so are people’s beliefs which are under-
pinned by normative values. To be legitimate, a power relation thus stands 
in need of fulfilling three conditions: conformity to rules of legal validity; 
justifiability of the rules in terms of beliefs shared by both subordinate and 
the powerful; actively and publicly expressed consent (Beetham 1991: 20). 
Let me now investigate, whether the actors of the cases chosen fulfill the 
conditions of legitimate power. 
HZDS and Meciar – Slovakia’s Actors 
How legitimate are the secessionist actors? Applying the model of legiti-
macy of power, I shall in the sequel analyze the legitimacy of the Slovak, 
Macedonian and Chechen actors in charge. 
The Slovak representative Premier Vladimir Meciar was democratically 
elected in the parliamentary elections in June 1992. His party HZDS as well 
as ODS, the party of Czech Premier Klaus, gained the plurality of the seats 
of the Federal Assembly, though not absolute majorities. Slovakia’s eco-
nomic situation deteriorated after the resignation of the Communist Party 
due to the prevalence of the large state-owned enterprises of the heavy in-
dustry, mining, smeltering and arms sectors. The reform strategy developed 
by Klaus led to massive protests in Slovakia. While Klaus favored an eco-
nomic shock-therapy, Meciar argued for a slower pace in the privatization 
process (Kirschbaum 1995: 268). Also, the common future of both nations 
was questioned; Slovak nationalism emerged as consequence of Czech 
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dominance of the Communist Federation and the First Republic’s democ-
ratic system. The talks on the Federal competencies did not lead to a com-
promise. The final negotiations between the two Premiers in summer 1992 
reached a standstill, since the positions were too diametrically opposed as to 
unify Czech and Slovak policy: Klaus and Meciar chose the option of sepa-
ration (Vodicka 1994: 181). Although the secessionist initiative clearly 
came from the Slovak side, the Czech Premier agreed with the separation of 
the country. The legitimacy of the democratically chosen actor Meciar and 
his party HZDS (Movement for a Democratic Slovakia) was not questioned 
by the international community. The new state due to start its existence on 1 
January 1993 was recognized without any reluctance. Also, Meciar (and 
with him, Slovak sovereignty) was ex post confirmed as Prime Minister in 
1994; until the parliamentary elections in September 1998, which put an end 
to the rule of HZDS and Meciar, the actor responsible for Slovak secession 
enjoyed high popularity among the citizens. Applying thus the dimensions 
of legitimacy to the Slovak secessionist actor, I can state that: a) the election 
of the prime minister corresponds with the rules of power of the multi-party 
system which emerged after the end of socialist rule. Meciar’s acquisition 
and exercise of power did conform with the legality required for democratic 
rule. However, the conformity of the secession in terms of the constitution 
seems problematic; I shall refer to this in the final section as it represents a 
problem of procedural legitimacy; b) The new rules of democratic power 
have been justified in terms of the beliefs of the subordinate. Particularly in 
Czechoslovakia, the new strata of politicians could emerge only out of the 
formerly ruled, as the harsh totalitarian system established in the "Normali-
zation Period" in the 1970s purged the party from even a minor opposition; 
c) The legitimacy of both the premiers was based on public consent ex-
pressed in the elections. The evidence of consent publicly expressed had 
been forced under communist rule; the collapse of the party’s single rule, its 
absolute delegitimation, was triggered by the withdrawal of popular consent 
(Beetham 1991: 20) in the general strike in December 1989. Because the 
lack of legitimacy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party de facto had started 
with the post-1968 establishment of a noticeably conservative government, 
the absolute loss of legitimacy can be interpreted as a steady process devel-
oping during a 20 year period. The party’s declining legitimacy was en-
forced by the existence of the dissident group Charter 77; therefore, the col-
lapse of 1989 was absolute and final. 
IMRO and the Socialist Government – FYR Macedonia’s Actors 
The actors initiating and promoting the Macedonian exit from Yugoslavia 
had to face significantly bigger difficulties on their way to state sovereignty. 
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With the crisis triggered by the Slovenian and Croatian secessionist proc-
esses, the democratically elected leadership was challenged by the threat of 
having to join Serbia and Montenegro in the Croatian war. Already in Au-
gust 1989, the Macedonian communist government had abolished the prin-
ciple of its single rule; the first multi-party elections took place in Novem-
ber 1990. In January 1991, the Assembly adopted the declaration of Sover-
eignty, which was confirmed in September by 65% (50% required) of the 
populace. The main secessionist actor was IMRO-DPMNU (Inner Macedo-
nian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party of Macedonian National 
Unity), the winner of the 1990 elections and coalition partner of the SMK-PDP 
(Communist Party Macedonia – Party for Democratic Prosperity). As a party 
with a historic predecessor (Boeckh 1996: 331ff.), IMRO played a national 
ticket and consequently engaged for exit.4 In contrast, the former communists 
under the elected President Kiro Gligorov had favored the Republic’s inde-
pendence within the framework of a reformed Yugoslav Federation based on 
common currency, foreign policy and army. IMRO’s claim for Macedonian 
state sovereignty was strengthened by the argument of non-involvement in the 
war, which gained massive support among the army and the population. The 
military drafting had already started, when President Gligorov’s negotiations 
with representatives of the Yugoslav National Army led to the withdrawal 
of the YNA troops from Macedonian territory in April 1991. Macedonia was 
de facto sovereign, but not yet de jure since the international community was 
reluctant to recognize the republic’s sovereignty. 
How legitimate were the Macedonian actors? a) Similar to the Slovak 
case, a newly emerged party took the initiative for secession. One of the 
core problems of democratic transition consists in the "time-gap" the consti-
tution is subject to: the secessionist process was "overtaking" the adoption 
of a new constitution which retrospectively provided the secession with le-
gality. However, the fact that IMRO was democratically elected, speaks in 
favor of dimensions a) and b): the relation of new democratic rules was jus-
tified in terms of the beliefs and values of the citizens. Untypical for a so-
cialist-turned-democratic society, however, was the fact that both the popu-
lace and the Socialist government shared democratic values and beliefs and 
 
4 IMRO was founded in 1893 in Saloniki; primarily a revolutionary organization 
fighting against Ottoman rule, the party initiated the Ilinden (St. Elijah’s) uprising in 
1903. The independent Republic of Krushevo, established as Macedonian national 
state after the first successes of the uprising, did not survive a fortnight. It was 
crushed by Osmanli authorities (Boeckh 1996: 331ff.). The Republic represents the 
only national self-expression of the Macedonians until the Comintern recognized the 
Macedonian nation in 1934; due to the assimilation policies exerted by the neighbor-
ing states Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, Macedonian nation-building did virtually not 
exist before the building of the Yugoslav Federation (Perry 1997: 229). 
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favored the option of democratic transition. The self-restrictive policy of the 
Macedonian League of Communists as well as President Gligorov’s popu-
larity helped to maintain the party’s legitimacy; c) IMRO as the initiative 
actor and SMK (now SDSM – Social-Democratic Party of Macedonia) as its 
coalition partner have been supported by popular consent; the legitimacy of 
the elected actor IMRO has not been questioned. Anti-secessionist protests 
among the Albanian minority, which amounts to approximately 23% of the 
population (Government Census Data 1994), did not question the legitimacy 
of the actors, but the legitimacy of the conduct of the referendum.5 I shall 
return to the Albanian critique below. Greece’s protests against Macedonian 
sovereignty were based on the choice of name; the section below will deal 
with the Greek critique of the legitimacy of the secessionist claim. 
Dudaev and Maskhadov and Troops– Chechnya’s Actors 
The Chechen attempt to withdraw from the Russian Federation failed. A 
further discussion on the future of Chechen sovereignty has been postponed 
to the year 2001. Before analyzing the legitimacy of the Chechen actors, let 
me clarify my standpoint: the peculiarity of the Chechen failed secession is 
based on the fact that she has been part of Russia for 400 years. The former 
nuclear super power is still regarded as an influential global actor regardless 
of the break-down of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Notwithstanding should Chechnya enjoy sovereign statehood, all the more 
as she had been forced to live under Russian rule; however, Russia’s will to 
keep the Caucasian Republics under her jurisdiction might be primarily 
based on economic reasons: access and control of the Caspian oil fields. 
Even though the international community openly criticized the way how 
Russia carried out the campaign and still does so, no country was willing to 
jeopardize its relations with Russia because of the small Caucasian Repub-
lic’s claim for sovereignty (Baker 1997).6 The point I wish to make is the 
following: although the international community’s reluctance to recognize 
Chechnya’s sovereignty is mostly based on fears of Russia’s power, the ac-
tors in Grozny also lacked legitimacy. Apart from the chaotic circumstances 
and the violations of human rights committed by both sides, some actions in 
the war- and post-war period led to serious doubts whether the sovereign 
 
5 According to the Government Census of 1994, the ethnic composition of the Ma-
cedonian populace is as follows: total 2’075’196 persons, of which are 66.5% slav 
Macedonians, 22.9% Albanians, 4% Turks, 2.3% Roma, 2% Serbs, 0.7% Muslim and 
0.004% Vlachs (Government 1994 Census Data). 
6 The Inauguration Ceremony of President Maskhadov was characterized by the 
complete absence of foreign representatives. Russia had threatened to break off rela-
tions with any country, that established diplomatic ties with Chechnya (Baker 1997). 
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Chechen state would be capable of establishing internal and external peace 
and stability. The ability and will to respect human rights were and probably 
still are a matter of further concern.  
A clear identification of the Chechen secessionist actors seems to be dif-
ficult, because the dynamics of the war led to the emergence of rebel 
groups, such as the command of Shamil Basayev. Neither the democrati-
cally elected leader Dudaev, nor Maskhadov, elected as President in January 
1997, seemed to be in full control of the troops (BBC, Profile). Elected in 
October 1991, President Dzokhar Dudaev declared Chechnya’s sovereignty 
in November. The new Constitution adopted in March 1992 declared 
Chechnya as an independent and secular state governed by a parliament and 
president (BBC, Profile). Russia refused to recognize both the declaration of 
Independence and the election of Dudaev; Russia’s increasing loss of con-
trol, Dudaev’s own lack of legitimacy among the troops and the hostage-
taking of Russian soldiers finally led to the invasion in 1994. While Du-
daev’s and Maskhadov‘s acquisition and exercise of power did conform to 
the legal codes justified by shared values and beliefs of the population in 
1991 and 1997 and were confirmed ex post by the adoption of the Chechen 
constitution, the elected leaders did not gain full legitimacy among the 
troops. The relationship between the political leader Maskhadov and the 
population has been legitimized by the consent expressed in the elections 
recognized by the Russian government (Baker 1997);7 however, beliefs and 
values concerning particularly the procedural details seem to divide the 
leadership from the rebel groups. The consent required for full legitimacy of 
the secessionist actors is therefore questioned. The human rights violations, 
a crucial point of the Chechen procedure, will be discussed in the final sec-
tion. Let me pass to the legitimacy of the basic argument, the contents of 
secessionist claims. 
Why – The Legitimacy of the Claim for Secession 
While the legitimacy of the secessionist actors is determined by the confor-
mity to the categories of legitimate power listed above, the legitimacy of a 
secessionist claim is directly linked with the problem of self-determination. 
Self-determination as principle of universal international law was regarded 
as basic and legitimate argument in the period of decolonisation. However, 
self-determination does not necessarily mean independent statehood, since it 
 
7 Maskhadov, a former military commander and separatist Prime Minister, has 
been officially recognized as Chechen representative by Russian Security Council 
chief Ivan Rybkin. The Inauguration ceremony was attended by Rybkin and Lebed as 
representatives of President Yeltsin (Baker 1997). 
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can be established within the given state by agreements granting the minor 
polity a larger extent of autonomy. Collective rights can grant the minority 
the use of its language as official administrative language of the territory 
inhabited; also, measures to enhance the administrative body’s autonomy 
seem to be supportive of the prevention of secessionist movements (Baer 
1999). According to international law, the collective right of self-determination 
can be interpreted as offensive, defensive or neutral, given the originary 
state’s territorial sovereignty as relevant category (Thürer 1997: 45ff.). Se-
cession thus represents the claim for the collective right of offensive self-
determination, because it is directed against the originary sovereignty. 
The question to be answered thus is as follows: What makes the claim 
for secession, more precisely, the claim for the transfer of sovereignty, le-
gitimate? Which conditions must be fulfilled to justify a polity’s demand for 
a territory, the industrial, military and administrative facilities included? 
Which arguments are most likely to convince the international community 
of the legitimacy of the secessionist claim? 
Generally, one could argue that every polity with a legitimate political 
representation and clearly defined borders is entitled to form a state of its 
own. In contrast, an unclear border situation accompanied by claims for ad-
ditional parts of the territory of the pre-secessionist state are likely to ques-
tion the secessionist movement. Had, hypothetically speaking, Macedonia’s 
sovereign statehood entailed the inclusion of parts of Western Bulgarian 
territory inhabited by the Macedonian minority, the international commu-
nity would have had to face a secessionist movement linked with an irreden-
tist claim to enlarge the secessionist territory. As precedence, the recogni-
tion of such a new state would immediately serve as legal fundament for 
justifying similar claims. The aim to change given state borders in order to 
reconstruct national and ethnic homogeneity, however, cannot be of interest 
for the international community. Bosnia’s example has clearly demon-
strated, to which extent stability can be threatened by a policy attempting to 
realize homogeneity. Thus, secessionist movements, which refer to a given 
and unchangeable territory, are more likely to be recognized than move-
ments claiming additional territorial units; they represent an immediate 
threat of regional stability. 
Further, since most of the secessionist territories enjoyed a distinct extent 
of administrative autonomy in the past, the argument of already existing 
state structures could indeed be favorable for recognition. While Chechnya 
still has the legal status of a Republic of the Russian Federation, the Soviet 
successor states like Ukraine, Belorus and Kazakhstan, the Slovak Republic 
as well as the Macedonian Republic had existed as distinct territorial and 
administrative units within federative structures. However, the practice of 
international law has shown, that the recognition of "secession plus state-
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formation" is considered according to three categories: first, recognition as 
remedium for institutionalized, massive and permanent discrimination and 
violations of human rights suffered by the polity (for example Bangladesh 
and East Timor); human rights violations by a state ideology (Soviet Repub-
lics, Yugoslav Republics); conquest, occupation, annexation (Soviet Repub-
lics, especially the Baltic States). Second, recognition as prevention of po-
litical and economic discrimination expected to happen or to continue in the 
future on the strength of evident experience in the past (Slovakia), self-
defense (FYR Macedonia). The third category of recognition could be de-
scribed as recognition as normal case (to a certain extent Israel), where self-
determination and statehood of a diaspora polity is acknowledged. While 
recognition as remedium, as reward for injustice suffered in the past, and 
recognition as preventive self-protection can be justified by the principles of 
international law, the third case is de facto very rare. All the more so as this 
classification represents an ideal undertaken for the purpose of suggesting 
normative criteria of international recognition. In reality, secession, state-
formation and the arguments justifying both claims rarely happen to corre-
spond with these ideal categories. Thus, how legitimate the actors in power 
and the claim for "secession plus state-formation" might be considered of, 
the third step of my analysis can be regarded as "litmus test": the legitimacy 
of the procedure represents a conditio sine qua non, since the way, how the 
secessionist process is undertaken, will provide the international environ-
ment with crucial information about the state-in-the-making and its leaders. 
But first, how legitimate are the secessionist claims of the countries chosen? 
Slovakia’s Claim 
Slovakia’s secession has been legitimized not only by nationalist arguments 
on behalf of the Slovak citizens; the deep disagreement on the future course 
of the Federation’s economic transformation has also been a legitimate ar-
gument for secession, in that secession is seen as a means of preventing fu-
ture economic discrimination. Also, the chance for political and economic 
self-determination was historically given. Eventually, the Czech recognition 
of the Slovak claim enhanced the legitimacy of Slovak statehood (Haver-
land 198: 387).8 An additional positive fact was that the Slovak secession 
never represented a serious challenge to the international community, be-
 
8 While the recognition of the secessionist unit’s newly acquired statehood by the 
predecessor state was considered the indispensable expression for the transfer of sover-
eignty in the past, present doctrine of international law acknowledges original emer-
gence of States as subjects of international law. Recognition by the predecessor state 
thus is regarded only as ascertainment of previous sovereignty (Haverland 1987: 38). 
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cause the Federation’s dissolution had been carried through under the juris-
diction of both its constitutive governments. 
FYR Macedonia’s Claim 
FYR Macedonia’s exit argument seemed to meet the requirements of le-
gitimacy, the more as the Federative Constitution explicitly granted the right 
of secession (Haverland 1987: 385). With the increasing threat of future in-
volvement in the war secession was justified as self-protective measure. 
Macedonian citizens did not want their soldiers to fight for an already lost 
Federation. Together with the former autonomous Republic of Kosovo, Ma-
cedonia was the least developed member of the Federation. Thus, when 
peaceful coexistence with Serbia and Montenegro ceased to be an option, 
the "last Titoists" decided to secede. However, the international community 
back in 1991 was reluctant to recognize Macedonia’s sovereignty due to the 
lobbying of Greece. The national-chauvinist Greek policy did not object to 
the state sovereignty of the former Yugoslav Republic, but to the name and 
the flag symbol, which were conceived of as being Greek national property. 
Even if historic arguments provided the Greek position with a certain extent 
of justification, the principle of self-determination includes the free choice 
of name.9 Greece’s obstruction policy evoked an additional instability in the 
eastern Balkans, which was only contained by the increasing crisis in Kos-
ovo and the political will of the Macedonian government for a compromise. 
Greece’s chairmanship of the EU was to begin in January 1994; in Decem-
ber 1993 the EU members France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy Denmark 
and the Netherlands recognized Macedonian statehood under the provisional 
name of FYR Macedonia before submitting a complaint of Greece’s viola-
tions of the Maastricht Treaty’s trade rules to the European Court of Justice. 
For the case of delayed Macedonian sovereignty, a limited right of seces-
sion, which would determinate secession as legitimate measure of self-
protection, would have been favorable; however, the international reluc-
tance indirectly supported the Greek boycotts and increased Macedonian 
trade losses. 
 
9 I am aware of the problem of the term "Makedonija" which can connotate region, 
state, language, nation, and nationality. However, my point is that such struggles can 
be negotiated at international institutions in a peaceful and constructive fashion. I 
therefore regard the Greek policy as highly dangerous and an unnecessary threat to 
the Balkan region’s unstable situation in the early nineties. 
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Chechnya’s Claim 
Finally, the Chechen claim for "secession plus state-formation" represents 
the most sensible case of our examples. Chechnya’s claim for sovereign 
statehood was underpinned by historic and national arguments: since the 
Chechens by virtue of being a nation had lived under "the Russian yoke", 
the actual political situation in 1991 provided a chance to claim for sover-
eignty. The absence of previous Chechen statehood due to the Russian con-
quest in 17th Century and the wish of self-determination in a state of its 
own as remedium for past unjust rule seem to justify Chechen secession and 
its immediate recognition. However, the international recognition failed to 
appear. As mentioned above, Russia is considered a global actor too influ-
ential as to risk jeopardizing seriously relations tying her to the international 
community. Also, the Chechen claim for a sovereign state is immediately 
connected with the peculiarities of its procedure. This will be discussed in 
the section below. 
How – The Legitimacy of Secessionist Procedure 
International law lacks precise definitions of procedural details favorable for 
international recognition. This seems to be a causality of the principle of 
self-determination, since the distinct fashion in which a polity expresses its 
sovereignty is directly determined by the actors and the basic secessionist 
argument. As mentioned before, I regard international recognition of a se-
cessionist movement as a three-faceted task. Thus, this section is dedicated 
to the third and last step, the legitimacy of the procedure undertaken. The 
procedural details, the fashion how a polity promotes its claim for secession, 
leads to assumptions determining the new state’s ability to manage, keep 
and exercise sovereignty in the future. Before I pass to the final analysis of 
our country cases, let me in the following make some general remarks on a 
peculiar issue, which is directly related to procedural legitimacy: the ques-
tion of participation in a secessionist movement. 
Who is entitled to the right to participate in a secessionist process? Given 
the above mentioned legitimacy of the actors based on popular consent of 
the ruled, how should we deal with the deliberate exclusion of a distinct 
community from the secessionist process? Referring to the examples of 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, the argument, that colonists and the descen-
dants of the nation occupying a country, had no moral right to have a voice 
in the decision whether to secede (Buchanan 1991: 159), seems convincing 
at first sight; all the more as secession is claimed for as remedy. The mem-
bership of the former independent Baltic Republics in the Soviet Union was 
based on occupation and annexation. The claim for sovereignty as reme-
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dium for unjust conquest in the past meets the moral condition required for 
a legitimate secession. However, considering the pragmatic difficulties in 
determining, who has been a Soviet "colonist", a "descendant of colonists" 
and who is a "normal" Lithuanian, Estonian or Latvian citizen of Russian 
origin working, living and paying taxes in the country, the argument seems 
not only to lack pragmatism. Far more, it serves as a theoretical basis for an 
exclusionist, nationalist policy triggering a process of discrimination and by 
doing so, provoking a further secessionist movement.  
I shall put my argument more generally: the discrimination of a minority 
living on secessionist territory and connected with the former ruling gov-
ernment by ethnic, national, religious, ideological or whatever ties can nei-
ther be justified by the "preventive" nor the "remedial" argument. The "pre-
ventive" argumentation is based on the assumption, that the minority in fear 
of its further discrimination or even extinction will immediately call the 
former power for defensive assistance. Therefore it represents by its very 
nature a crucial obstacle on the polity’s way to statehood. According to the 
martial logic of the nation‘s survival, the minority thus cannot be given 
equal rights. These mono-causal dynamics based on mere assumptions and 
prejudices characterize to a large extent irredentist movements which I will 
not deal with here. The "remedial" argumentation, on the contrary, focuses 
on the past status of the ruling minority; although retaliation is psychologi-
cally understandable, new discrimination cannot be justified by reference to 
suffered discrimination. From an ethical point of view, neither a "balance of 
discrimination" nor "a right to remedial violence" can be justified, because 
the consequences of such mathematics would entirely destabilize the inter-
national system. Retaliation thus is barely a reasonable way to re-establish 
justice. Therefore, secession cannot be argued for by claiming for a remedy 
for suffered discrimination while committing discrimination at the same 
time, regardless which polity might be concerned. The deliberate exclusion 
of a distinct number of citizens from the right to participate in political deci-
sion-making, whose consequences they will be subject to as everybody else, 
represents only a further spiraling down of the already existing gap between 
the communities. Even if such an exclusionist policy is legitimized by popu-
lar consent of the secessionist polity at the ballots meeting thereby the con-
ditions of free and democratic elections, it lacks legitimacy since it fosters 
unequal treatment and violates the political rights of members of a distinct 
group. The consequences of such a discrimination will indeed fulfill the se-
cessionist polity’s original fears: the minority lacking equal rights will have 
to search for alternatives in order to promote its political representation. In 
need of pure self-interest it also has to develop a potentially disloyal dispo-
sition toward the new state. A state-in-being excluding a minority from po-
litical participation does not sufficiently convince of its ability and will to 
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respect the rights of its citizens in the future, regardless, on which grounds 
the minority is constituted. 
Interestingly, the Macedonian secessionist procedure entailed the very 
contrary of the above mentioned exclusion; the legitimacy of the procedure 
is questioned. Let me therefore finally pass to the countries’ procedures and 
the analysis of their legitimacy. 
Slovakia’s Procedure 
The procedural details of the Slovak secessionist movement did correspond 
largely with the Czech political course. This exceptional case could be de-
scribed as an ideal secession. Both sides, merely united in the wish to get rid 
of the other, agreed on the issue of Slovak secession, which was further en-
hanced by the civilized manner in which the separation was negotiated. 
Also, the decision to secede was legitimized by the Czechoslovak Federal 
Parliament, which voted for the separation (Kirschbaum 1995: 270). How-
ever, according to the old Federative Constitution, neither of the democrati-
cally elected Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic and Slovakia were le-
gally enabled to abolish the Federation: a plebiscite would have been re-
quired (Vodicka 1994: 182). The argument, that the Slovak secession lacked 
procedural legitimacy since it was not justified by a plebiscital ballot, was 
further strengthened by a survey carried out in 1991: according to the sur-
vey’s results only 6% of the Czechs and 11% of the Slovaks would vote for 
separation (Vodicka 1994: 181). However, after the Slovak secession had 
been negotiated, neither Czech nor Slovak political parties attempted to 
question the separation by promoting a policy, which aimed at the rebuild-
ing of the Federation. The main reason of the citizens‘ acceptance might 
have been passivity.10 Although the Slovak secession was not confirmed by 
direct democratic voting, the actors were democratically elected members of 
Parliament. I therefore regard the conduct of the separation as legitimate 
since it met the requirements of a legitimate procedure respecting the rules 
of the representative democratic system. 
FYR Macedonia’s Procedure 
Although the Macedonian secession was legitimized by the referendum con-
firming the secession ex post, the conduct of the referendum lacked legiti-
 
10 The point of civic passivity which resulted in the acceptance of the separation 
was confirmed by Dr. Dusan Kovac, historian and General secretary of the Slovak 
Academy of Science, as well as by Mr. Ivan Miklos, Vice-chairman of the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda. My interviews with Dr. Kovac and Mr. 
Miklos took place in January 1999 in Bratislava. 
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macy due to a crucial detail: it was not limited to Macedonian citizens in-
habiting the territory of the Republic but extended to all Macedonians re-
gardless of their place of birth or place of living. The legal distinction be-
tween citizenship and nationality therefore was violated (Danforth 1995: 
143). The only category of identification was the self-ascription of the vot-
ers of being Macedonian, e.g. of Macedonian nationality and South Slav 
ethnicity. This questionable inclusion of Macedonian diaspora groups in all 
parts of the world led to the boycott of the Albanians: the community re-
fused to participate in the census in 1991. The grave mistake of extending 
the referendum, however, seemed to have led to an improvement of Mace-
donia’s minority policy: challenged by radical Albanian claims for the status 
of a state-constitutive nation as well as by similar Serb claims, the Macedo-
nian governments have since understood to balance these difficulties by a 
policy of integration to NATO and the EU. The Albanian community’s fears 
of future cultural and economic discrimination in the Macedonian nation-
state have been weakened by the policy of integrating elected Albanian 
members of the radical PDP-A to the government of Ljubcho Georgievski 
(IMRO), elected in 1998. Since Georgievski’s government did not need the 
backing of the Albanians, as the coalition of IMRO and DA (Democratic 
Alternative) had a clear parliamentary majority, these measures demonstrate 
the government’s soundness in dealing with minority issues.11 Also, in 1993, 
the Assembly had established the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations which 
consists of members of the minority communities dealing with the im-
provement of inter-ethnic relations and integration issues (Jakimovski 1994: 
39). Since her decision to secede, Macedonia was capable of finding a way 
to cope with the difficulties and dangers of the Balkan region by pursuing a 
policy of respect of human and minority rights. The close cooperation with 
the international organizations OSCE and NATO, particularly during the 
Kosovo crisis, the respect of democratic principles and a pragmatic way of 
dealing with the difficulties typical for the multi-ethnically composed region 
have made the country a factor of stability in the eastern Balkans. 
 
11 The outcome of the 1998 parliamentary elections: IMRO-DPMNU 28,1%, DA 
(Democratic Alternative) 10.7%, together 59 seats, SDSM (Social-democratic Union 
of Macedonia) 25.1% and 29 seats, PDP, PDP-A and NDP (National Democratic 
Party) 19.3% and 25 seats, LPD/DPM (Liberal-democratic Party / Democratic Party 
of Macedonia) 7.0% and 4 seats. The smaller parties representing the Roma, the 
Turks, the Serbs, the Vlachs and the Socialists gained together 4.7% and 3 seats (po-
lis.net/macedonia). 
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Chechnya’s Procedure 
Reports on rival groups fighting against the Chechen command and com-
mitting human rights violations made political support virtually impossible 
for the international community. Since Russia withdrew her troops in spring 
1997, Chechnya was de facto independent; the government under President 
Maskhadov, however, failed to control the various criminal groups. Hos-
tage-taking as source of income, kidnapping of foreign journalists and the 
killing of Red Cross workers were not helpful to convince the international 
community of Chechnya’s ability to form a stable state respecting human 
rights and political agreements. Also, the confusion caused by the Russian 
intervention and the prevailing presence of various military commands 
claiming to defend Chechen independence did contribute to the international 
reluctance in recognizing Chechnya as independent state. As long as the 
wish for state sovereignty is expressed by violent actions endangering the 
immediate neighborhood of the Republic of Dagestan, neither support nor 
recognition will be considered by the international community. A future de-
cision supporting Chechen independence will depend to a large extent on 
Russia’s policy. At the time of writing, the second war between Russia and 
Chechnya seems to be likely to finish. 
Concluding Remarks 
Based on practice and principles of international law, this article concerned 
the analysis of criteria of secessionist legitimacy. Focussed on the "seces-
sion plus state-formation" case, the aim was to suggest normative political 
criteria crucial for the assessment of secessionist legitimacy. The fact that 
international law does not contain a right of secession nor a definition of the 
term "nation" led to the issue of international recognition: secessionist poli-
ties depend on international recognition of their sovereignty. Due to the "Ja-
nus-faced" character of the principle of self-determination, "secession plus 
state-formation" is still regarded as a potential source of international disor-
der. The secessionist polity therefore has to prove that the originary state’s 
sovereignty lacks legitimacy. At the same time, by doing so, it has to 
demonstrate convincingly, that the exit process fulfills the requirements de-
manded for the recognition of its statehood. The tendency to recognize only 
secessionist movements which claim for sovereignty as reward for unjust 
rule (Buchanan 1997: 61), lacks measures for dealing with the seldom but 
existing cases of preventive secession. As the cases of Slovakia and Mace-
donia have shown, self-protection as measure to prevent expected discrimi-
nation must be a factor considered for the recognition of a new state. Even 
more so as the legitimacy of the actors, their justification of the secessionist 
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claim as well as the procedure undertaken demonstrated the will to exit. 
With other words: the claim for secession can be legitimized by various his-
toric, preventive (self-protection) and remedial (unjust sovereignty) argu-
ments; however, the legitimacy of the actors approved by popular and pub-
lic consent and the procedure chosen (non-violent, non-discriminatory, ne-
gotiated, internationally monitored) are conditions necessary for recogni-
tion. Because "secession plus state-formation" lacks clear legal definition, 
the secessionist process has to be legitimate by meeting the needs of legiti-
macy of the actors (Who), the claim (Why) and the procedure (How). 
The three-folded model of secessionist legitimacy presented in this paper 
aimed to contribute to the issue of which polity, why and by virtue of which 
procedure "secession plus state-formation" should be recognized. It at-
tempted to suggest criteria relevant for the decision-making by legal institu-
tions. To be legitimate, a polity has to prove, that its representatives, its 
claim for exit as well as the procedure chosen represent the common sense. 
Further, the actors, the claim and the procedure have to be approved by the 
polity on the grounds of shared beliefs and values. Particularly the relations 
with minorities represent the "Rosetta Stone" of the secessionist process: if 
the principle of citizens‘ equality is infringed by discrimination of a group, 
the internal situation of the future state is not likely to develop stability and 
peace. In this context, women’s rights form an important issue. Although 
not a minority, women are still subject to unequal treatment in many coun-
tries. Thus, elections have to meet the conditions of free and democratic vot-
ing and must be accessible to all citizens of the secessionist territory. 
Also, the citizens of the originary state should be entailed in the voting. 
Why? Given their majority, it seems very likely that they will prefer the 
anti-secessionist agenda. They therefore represent an obstacle to the exit 
process. However, considering the advantages of elections for the gathering 
of detailed information on citizens’ preferences, the inclusion of the (as-
sumed) anti-secessionist part of the populace in the voting offers an impor-
tant possibility: negotiations between the polities can lead to a compromise 
in form of federal solutions and/or consociational agreements by virtue of 
which the minor polity enjoys granted share in power. Assuming the ideal 
case of international monitoring of the ballot, a further positive factor of the 
voting concerns the freedom of opinion-making: the voting requires free and 
equal access to media and the granted financial share for the pre-election 
campaign of the secessionist polity. Thus, even before secession has been 
object to democratic voting, the principles of equality of all citizens can be 
established in the pre-election period. As mentioned, the establishment of 
such ideal conditions seems highly idealistic; however, since I am con-
vinced that free information represents a barrier against manipulative rheto-
ric and dynamics of both polities, pre-election monitoring and the democ-
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ratic procedure as ‚exit through voting‘ can help to diminish politically con-
structed and fostered incentives for violent actions. The procedure men-
tioned will further offer a clearer picture of how the secessionist polity and 
its representatives relate to the predecessor state and the minorities. A seces-
sionist movement, which pursues a "preventive" and/or "remedial" agenda 
against a distinct group of citizens denying them human rights and equal 
treatment lacks decisively procedural legitimacy. 
Finally, does international law in general require a limited right of seces-
sion? Such a right seems to be a two-edged sword. In the case of FYR Ma-
cedonia clear legal codes determining the requirements for secession and 
recognition would have been helpful. Also, additional international monitor-
ing of the referendum could have helped to prevent the illegitimate exten-
sion of the vote to the diaspora groups, which represented a clear discrimi-
nation of the Albanian community and the smaller minorities. The advan-
tage and disadvantage of such a right lie in its bargaining function: it can be 
made use of by a potentially secessionist polity as threat in order to establish 
and constitutionally grant minority rights. At the very same time, however, 
it can also block governmental rule on the long run and deepen the cleavage 
between the polities. A limited right topically determining self-protection 
and remedium could trigger secessionist processes and provoke instability 
since it questions the very source of stability of the states: the territorial in-
tegrity. Although the state of "Padania" was only symbolically established 
by the Northern Italian secessionist movement LEGA, such a right could be 
made use of by movements less humorous and more eager to realize their 
secessionist wishes by violent means. 
To conclude, current history has shown, "secession plus state-formation" 
movements emerge generally because of human rights violations and per-
manent discrimination. The crucial moment where secession is opted for 
consists in the loss of belief that every other measure lacks efficiency. I 
therefore don’t conceive of such a limited right to be required. In order to 
meet the requirements of international law, which are territorial sovereignty, 
international stability and the protection of human rights, I regard interna-
tional monitoring as well as the criteria of legitimacy advocated for in this 
paper as crucial prerequisites. 
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Wer, warum und wie: Beurteilungskategorien der Legitimität 
von Sezession 
 
Mit dem Zusammenbruch der globalen Bipolarität war die internatio-
nale Staatengemeinschaft mit Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen in Ost-, 
Mittel- und Südosteuropa konfrontiert. Aufgrund des aussergewöhnli-
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chen Zwangscharakters der sowjetischen und jugoslawischen Verfas-
sungen sowie der Sowjetischen Hegemonie in Mitteleuropa kann der 
Wunsch nach Eigenstaatlichkeit als Summe einzelner Sezessionsbe-
wegungen interpretiert werden. Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht Se-
zession als moralisches Problem des Völkerrechts und versucht, nor-
mative Kriterien für die Beurteilung der Legitimität von Sezession(en) 
zu definieren. Welche Bedingungen müssen erfüllt sein, damit eine Se-
zession als legitim gilt? Durch welche politischen, sozialen oder histo-
rischen Merkmale sollte eine legitime Sezession charakterisiert sein, 
um die Anerkennung der internationalen Staatengemeinschaft zu erhal-
ten? Die vorliegende Analyse wird auf drei Ebenen ausgeführt: die Le-
gitimität der Akteure (Wer), diejenige der Sezessionsforderung, das 
heisst des Arguments, mit dem die Akteure die Sezession begründen, 
und die Legitimität des Verfahrens (Wie). Die Beispiele dreier Sezes-
sionen, der Slowakei, FYR Mazedoniens und Tschetscheniens sollen 
die Analyse verdeutlichen. 
 
 
Qui, pourquoi et comment: Catégories de juger la légitimité de 
sécession 
 
Avec la fin de la bipolarité la communauté internationale envisageait 
les mouvements d’indépendance en Europe Centrale, de l‘ Est et Sud-
Est. En référance au caractère coercive des Constitutions Soviétique et 
Yougoslave, le désire pour l’indépendance d’état, pour la souveraineté 
se peut comprendre comme des mouvements sécessionnistes singu-
liers. Essayant à définir des catégories normatives supportives pour 
mettre un jugement des mouvements sécessionnistes, cet article est 
concerné avec sécession comme problème éthique du droit public. 
Qu’est-ce que sont les catégories nécessaires pour qu’une sécession 
soit jugée comme légitime? Quelles sont les caractéristiques politiques, 
historiques et sociales pour obtenir la récognition internationale? 
L’analyse suivante est séparée en 3 niveaux: le niveau de la légitimité 
des acteurs (Qui), de l’argument sécessionniste (Pourquoi) et de la lé-
gitimité procédurale (Comment). L’analyse serait illustrée par les 
exemples de la Slovaquie, FYR Macédonie et la Chechnie. 
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